Study of Internal Pressure Impact on Sphere Tank Towards Vapour Cloud Explosion: Feyzin Incident by Binti Mohd Suhaimi Yeong, Anis Farhanah et al.
  
 
Vol.8 (2018) No. 6 
ISSN: 2088-5334 
Study of Internal Pressure Impact on Sphere Tank Towards Vapour 
Cloud Explosion: Feyzin Incident 
Anis Farhanah Binti Mohd Suhaimi Yeong#,*, Zulkifli Abdul Rashid#,*, Azil Bahari Alias#,* 
#
 Faculty of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi MARA, 40450 Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia 
 E-mail: anisfarhanahmsy@gmail.com, zulmas06@yahoo.com.my, azilbahari@salam.uitm.edu.my 
 
* INPRES Research Group, Universiti Teknologi MARA, 40450 Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia 
E-mail: anisfarhanahmsy@gmail.com, zulmas06@yahoo.com.my, azilbahari@salam.uitm.edu.my 
 
 
Abstract— In the case of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) tank explosion(s), risk impact assessment on the storage facilities must be 
carried out. Since every LPG tank has its operating condition, it is essential to decide what the best operating conditions are for each 
tank. This effort is made to avert an accident from happening, as fires and explosions can be devastating in terms of lives lost and 
destruction to buildings and the environment. Boil-off and/or ignition of flammable gas can cause the pressure in the tank to increase. 
Therefore, a method called Planas-Cuchi is applied to determine the Peak Side-On Overpressure, Po, of the LPG tank during the 
occurrence of explosion. Thermodynamic properties of saturated propane, C3H8, has been chosen as a reference and basis of 
calculation to determine the parameters involved, such as Explosion Energy, E, Equivalent Mass of TNT, WTNT, and Scaled 
Overpressure, PS. A cylindrical LPG tank in Feyzin Refinery, France is selected as a point of study in this research. At the end of this 
study, the most suitable operating pressure of the LPG tank will be determined, and the results are compared and validated using the 
TNT Equivalent (BREEZE software), Baker-Strehlow model and ARIA investigation report. 
 
Keywords— LPG; peak side-on overpressure; planas-cuchi; explosion; feyzin. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the demand for LPG keeps rising, notably in the 
commercial and residential sectors of developing countries. 
This is in line with the increasing population growth and 
total demand for energy. LPG is often composed of propane, 
butane or some combination thereof, and they are stored in 
liquid form under pressure. However, they vaporize into gas 
form when the pressure is released. The broad application of 
LPG also raises the potential for fires and leaks in the LPG 
containers. These incidents may lead to a more severe 
accident as they are exposed to the risk of BLEVE or VCE 
occurrence. 
It is learned that nearly all the cases reported in the 
literature refer to open environments while BLEVE or VCE 
occurrence in confined or congested areas are infrequent [1]. 
The Feyzin Refinery accident in France happened in a 
clearing (open space), and for this reason, it has been chosen 
as this research’s point of the study. The open space 
situation also justifies the use of TNT Equivalent method 
instead of Baker-Strehlow. With regards to a VCE event, it is 
normally caused by pressure changes in the LPG sphere tank 
leakage. The effect of pressure changes that lead to fire and 
explosion will have severe consequences on the surrounding. 
Therefore, the impacts will be assessed through the 
manipulation of pressure changes in the LPG tank using 
mathematical models related to VCE such as TNT 
Equivalent and Planas-Cuchi [2]. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
A. Study area: LPG storage facility at Feyzin Refinery, 
France 
On the morning of January 4th, 1966, a series of explosion 
went down at a standard LPG storage facility in Feyzin 
(Rhône), France. Due to a human error caused by an 
operator with the valves, there came to be a leak coming 
from T61-443 propane sphere that brought about an 
unfortunate BLEVE incident. According to the French 
Ministry of the Environment [3], the Feyzin refinery has a 
total capacity of 13,000 m3 and is located 22.5 m from the 
highway called the A7 highway. The fireball created a 
destructive blast wave through Rhône valley, shattering 
windows up to a distance of 8 km. 45 minutes after the first 
BLEVE occurred at tank T61-443, a second BLEVE ensued 
at tank T61-442. The accident resulted in a death toll of 18 
people, leaving 89 injured and vandalizing 6 fire trucks, 
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1475 shelters with its explosions. 12 storage vessels were 
also destroyed; 6 spheres, 2 cylinders, and 4 floating cap 
tanks, while tones of flammable materials were burned; 1012 
t of propane, 2027 t of butane and 1500 t of LPG product. 
Based on Figure 1, the propane gas started to escape from 
the 2-inch bottom-venting pipe of sphere tank T61-443 for 
approximately 10 minutes when the operator failed to close 
the first valve. It is estimated that the initial mass flow rate 
of propane released into the atmosphere to be 11.5 kg/s [4]. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Simplification of fire explosion occurrence at sphere tank T61-443 
 
TABLE I 
PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF PROPANE, C3H8 
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 
 Appearance: colorless gas. (Cold vapor cloud may be 
white, but the lack of visible gas cloud does not indicate 
the absence of gas). A colorless liquid when pressurized. 
 Vapour density: 1.87 kg/m3 at 15°C and 1 atm 
 Liquid density: 580 kg/m3 
CHEMICAL PROPERTIES 
 Molecular weight: 44.09 
 Melting point/freezing point: -189.7°C (-309.4°F) 
 Boiling point: -42.11°C (-43.8°F) 
 Flash point: -104°C (-155.2°F) 
 Auto-ignition temperature: 450°C (842°F) 
 
Table 1 provides the vital information on the chemical 
and physical properties of LPG (propane) that was stored in 
tank T61-443. The data are needed to determine the impacts 
of the incident.  
Circumstances above lead to the calculated quantity of 
released propane at 6.9 tones (11.5 kg/s x 600 s). In the first 
10 minutes from when the leakage started, no fire or 
explosion had occurred in the Feyzin refinery plant. 
Witnesses stated that the fire incident at tank T61-443 only 
happened 25 minutes after the dispersion of propane cloud 
around the plant. The cause of fire came from a car that had 
moved into the propane cloud, resulting in the ignition of the 
cloud, producing a flash fire that propagated back to tank 
T61-443 [3]. By considering Davenport et al. (1993) 
findings for the delayed ignition that occurred only 60 
minutes after release time of propane gas at sphere T61-443 
and the decrement of flow rate to 8kg/s after 10 minutes, the 
quantity of released propane for the next 25 minutes is 
calculated to be 12 tones (8 kg/s x 1500 s) [5]. This makes 
the total amount of liquid propane released to be 18.9 tones 
(6.9+12 tones). Although there was an uncontrolled release 
(leakage) from the valve opening to minimize the pressure 
changes, the gas released was not enough to relieve the 
pressure rise in the sphere [6]. 
B. Prediction methods 
In this paper, selected models used in the analysis of VCE 
will be discussed. Thus, the result obtained from the 
accidents above will be carefully analyzed to estimate the 
suitability of these models. 
1) TNT Equivalent and Baker-Strehlow Methods versus 
Planas-Cuchi+TNT Equivalent Coupling Method: 
Previously, the TNT and Baker-Strehlow (BS) methods are 
often used to predict VCE blast load impacts. TNT model 
has some issues to its use and is considered to be less 
accurate as it less attttention on the obstacles that may affect 
the pressure contours. Baker-Strehlow however, includes 
obstacle into its calculation, therefore, making it more 
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accurate than TNT. Nevertheless, all 3 models do not make 
allowance for what happens to the flammable material (LPG) 
contained in the sphere tank given its thermodynamics 
aspect to which an inaccurate result is produced. The 
Planas-Cuchi and TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
considers from when the flammable material is within the 
operating conditions until just before it explodes and forms 
VCE. What happens inside the sphere is already justified by 
the experimental work done using the Peng-Robinson 
Equation of State simulation prepared in the MATLAB 
(Source: BiTP Vol. 30 Issue 2, 2013, pp. 31-39). This 
reduces the inaccuracies gap of the calculation result. 
Taking the operating pressure as a criterion for analyzing 
the magnitude of consequences impact, a pressure of 10 bar 
to design pressure of sphere tank of 60 bar is constructed at 
an interval of 10 bar. The worst pressure consequences can 
be determined from these stages of the process. The safety 
valve was set to lift open at 20 bar (corresponding to 
propane temperature of 60°C) to prevent the internal 
pressure of tank from reaching its rupture pressure. 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the pressure inside the 
vessel had remained at 20 bar while boiling off the liquid 
propane into vapor. 
There is a sudden physical process related to the 
disintegration of the tank and rapid transition in the state of 
the LPG present in the tank that creates a wave of 
overpressure that propagates through the atmosphere, 
causing some serious damages from its immense energy. 
When the wall of the tank begins to fracture, it will cause a 
rapid pressure drop up to patm, at which the boiling 
temperature for liquefied gases is significantly lower than 
the ambient temperature [7]. This will release the liquid in 
which part of it will evaporate and rapidly create a boiling 
pool, or its vapor will burn if ignited. Then, propane will 
rapidly change its state from that of liquid to gas. This 
liquid-to-gas transition will result in a tremendous increase 
in volume taken up by the LPG in the tank, causing it to 
exceed the critical parameters; a change from liquid to 
‘overcritical liquid’ state. This will inevitably result in an 
explosion of the ‘overcritical liquid’ contained in the tank 
[8]. 
 
TABLE  II 
THERMODYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF SATURATED PROPANE, C3H8 – PRESSURE TABLE 
Pressure, 
bar 
Temperature Specific Volume, m3/kg Internal Energy, kJ/kg 
°C K     
17.00 49.65 322.8 2.227 0.02606 228.3 472.7 
18.00 52.30 325.45 2.253 0.02441 236.2 474.9 
19.00 54.83 327.98 2.280 0.02292 243.8 476.9 
20.00 57.27 330.42 2.308 0.02157 251.3 478.7 
22.00 61.90 335.05 2.364 0.01921 265.8 481.7 
24.00 66.21 339.36 2.424 0.01721 279.7 484.3 
26.00 70.27 343.42 2.487 0.1549 293.1 486.2 
28.00 74.10 347.25 2.555 0.01398 306.2 487.5 
30.00 77.72 350.87 2.630 0.01263 319.2 488.1 
35.00 86.01 359.16 2.862 0.009771 351.4 486.3 
       
2) TNT Equivalent and Baker-Strehlow Methods versus 
Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling Method: This 
coupling method is used to determine the Peak Side-On 
Overpressure, Po, by considering the thermodynamic 
properties of propane (C3H8) at various pressure differences. 
To get the Explosion Energy, E value at the respective 
pressure difference, ΔP , the thermodynamic properties of 
propane. Table 2 below provides the thermodynamic 
properties of saturated propane by the view of the pressure 
found (bar). The details to Planas Cuchi + TNT Equivalent 
Coupling method used can be referred in [9], [10]. In this 
study, several pressures must be known to predict the impact 
coming from the fire and explosion. The pressures are: 
• Maximum set pressure (MSP) = 1870 kPa  
• Upstream pressure (MSP + atmospheric pressure) = 18.7 
+ 1 bar = 19.7 bar = 1970 kPa  
• Burst pressure = 2210 kPa 
• Test pressure = 28.05 bar = 2805 kPa  
• Prediction impact from sphere wall T61-443 fire 
explosion 
Table 3 and 4 are used as guidelines to estimate the 
consequences done to human and structure. 
 
TABLE  III 
CONSEQUENCES OF OVERPRESSURE ON STRUCTURES AND PEOPLE [11] 
Overpressure (kPa) Effect on Structures Effect on the Human Body 
6.9(E8) Window glass shutters Light injuries from fragments occur 
13.8(E10) Moderate damage to houses (windows and doors blown out and severe damage to roofs) People injured by flying grass or debris 
20.7(E13, lower) Residential structures collapse Serious injuries are common, fatalities may occur 
34.5(E14, lower) Most buildings collapse Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread 
69.0 (E15) Reinforced concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished Most people are killed 
137.9(E16)  Heavily built concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished Fatalities approach 100% 
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TABLE  IV 
CONSEQUENCES OF OVERPRESSURE ON BUILDING AND STRUCTURES [12] 
Overpressure 
(kPa) 
Damage 
0.21(E1) The occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain 
0.69(E2) Breakage of small windows under strain 
1.03(E3) Typical pressure for glass breakage 
2.07(E4) “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 of no severe damage below this value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceilings; 
10% window glass broken 
2.76(E5) Limited minor structural damage 
3.4 – 6.9(E6) Large and small windows usually shatter; occasional damage to window frames 
4.8(E7) Minor damage to house structures 
6.9(E8) Partial demolition of houses, inhabitable, corrugated asbestos shatters; corrugated steel/aluminum panels, fastenings fail, 
followed by buckling; wood panels (standard housing), panels blow in 
6.9 – 13.8(E9) Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses, concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shatter 
13.8(E10) 50% destruction of brickwork of houses 
13.8 – 20.7(E11) Frameless, self-framing steel panel buildings demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks 
17.2(E12) The cladding of light industrial buildings ruptures 
20.7 – 27.6(E13) Wooden utility poles snap; tall hydraulic presses (40,000 lb) in buildings slightly damaged 
34.5 – 48.2(E14) Nearly destruction of houses 
68.9(E15) Probable destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools (7,000 lb), moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools 
(12,000 lb) survive 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this analysis, the amount of propane involved was 
336,000 kg with a total volume of 1,218 m3. To compare the 
Planas-Cuchi and TNT Equivalent Coupling method with 
TNT Equivalent and Baker-Strehlow methods, the same 
radius of 50 m, 100 m, 150 m, 160 m, 300 m, 2.2 km, 4.2 km, 
8 km, and 16 km [10] have been used as fixed variables in 
the comparison of peak overpressure between the 3 methods. 
A. Prediction of burst pressure over sphere wall T61-443 
The rupture pressure can be estimated from knowledge of 
the membrane stress in a spherical vessel. 
                      Rupture pressure, 
 =  


  (1) 
Where, 
Wall thickness, t = 45 mm = 0.045 m 
The tensile strength of structural steel,  = 620 MN/m 
Based on Equation (1), the blast from sphere tank T61-
443’s wall will occur when the pressure inside the sphere is 
79.71 bar, closing to 80 bar. 
(
 =  =
   . "  # $ %
$
= 79.71 bar ≈ 80 bar 
 
To verify that the blast at sphere tank T61-443 had 
occurred at a pressure exceeding 79.71 bar, a detailed 
analysis is carried out by considering the sphere tank T61-
443’s internal pressure changes, .
, that is from the normal 
operation pressure of 18.7 bar to 20 until 80 bar. Table 5.1 
till 5.9 show the comparison made between the Planas-Cuchi 
+ TNT Equivalent Coupling model and ARIA report. 
B. Comparison of prediction of peak overpressure from P = 
20 bar to P =80 bar using Planas Cuchi + TNT 
Equivalent Coupling method with the ARIA report from 
Table V to XIII. 
TABLE  V 
AT P = 2000 KPA (20 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 42.06 E14 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 15.70 E11 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 9.79 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 9.12 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 4.69 E7 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 0.63 E2 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.33 E1 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.17 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.09 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
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TABLE VI 
AT P = 3000 KPA (30 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 121.86 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 33.98 E14 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 19.10 E11 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 17.58 E11 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 8.47 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.11 E3 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.58 E2 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.30 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.15 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
TABLE  VII 
AT P = 4000 KPA (40 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 179.17 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 45.35 E14 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 24.26 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 22.20 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 10.30 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.32 E3 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.69 E2 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.36 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.18 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
TABLE  VIII 
AT P = 4248 KPA (42.48 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 195.96 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 48.62 E14 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 25.68 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 23.45 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 10.74 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.37 E3 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.72 E2 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.38 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.19 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
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TABLE IX 
AT P = 5000 KPA (50 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 236.31 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 56.25 E14 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 28.96 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 26.36 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 11.84 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.49 E3 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.78 E2 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.41 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.21 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
TABLE X 
AT P = 6000 KPA (60 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 285.05 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 65.38 E15 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 32.77 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 29.71 E13 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 13.02 E9 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.62 E4 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.85 E3 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.45 E2 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.22 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
TABLE XI 
AT P = 7000 KPA (70 BAR)* 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 329.38 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 73.63 E15 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 36.13 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 32.66 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 14.02 E11 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.73 E4 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.90 E3 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.47 E2 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.24 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
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TABLE XII 
AT P = 7500 KPA (75 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of propane 
at T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 350.04 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 77.47 E15 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 37.68 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 34.02 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 14.47 E11 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.77 E4 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.93 E3 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.49 E2 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.24 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
TABLE XIII 
AT P = 8000 KPA (80 BAR) 
Incident Case Radius Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent Coupling method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of 
propane at 
T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) Diagnose Diagnose 
50 369.77 E15 Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 81.13 E15 Injuries are universal; fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 39.15 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 35.30 E14 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 14.88 E11 Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.82 E4 Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.95 E3 Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.50 E2 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.25 E1 Blast from the explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
Note: Some row and columns are highlighted/shaded means that it complies to the ARIA report. 
 
Some row and columns are highlighted or shaded, which 
means that they are complying with the ARIA report. Based 
on the results obtained from Table 5.1 to 5.9, it indicates that 
the damages sustained in the event of T61-443 sphere tank 
exploding shows the expression level of damage on 
buildings and structures that surround the area of the 
explosion. The witnesses’ in Feyzin refinery when the 
internal pressure inside T61-443 rises to 70-80 bar when the 
distance of a receptor that absorbs the explosion energy is 
between 300 m to 16 km. The results are closer to the real 
damage that had occurred at the site between 50-160 m 
could make an explosion of T61-443 occur when the internal 
pressure of the tank is at 30 bar. This indicates that the 
probability for rupture of T61-443 wall surface before 
reaching the wall’s burst pressure of 80 bar, maybe a 
legitimate hypothesis. To measure the extent to which the 
accuracy of the model results in Planas-Cuchi + TNT 
Equivalent, comparisons on the measurement of the level of 
damage done are conducted on the other two models, namely, 
Baker-Strehlow and TNT Equivalent [13]. 
In Table 6, the comparison is being made at P = 70 bar 
because it is the point of pressure change that starts to 
comply most with the ARIA report. Then, the overpressure 
at different radii is calculated using the 3 methods above and 
is compared to one another whilst using the French Ministry 
of Environment report as guideline in determining the 
accuracy of each model. Table 6 shows the Planas-Cuchi + 
TNT Equivalent Coupling method to have the most accurate 
or most similar diagnose as the ones done in ARIA Report. 
On the other hand, TNT Equivalent method alone shows 
little accuracy in for the near-range distances but soon 
begins to conform to that of ARIA report. Meanwhile, 
Baker-Strehlow shows quite different values from the 
witness’ observation. Between 50 – 160 m, the overpressure 
value generated from the explosion at tank T61-443 has 
dropped quite drastically for the Coupling method and TNT 
Equivalent method, particularly in the latter while Baker-
Strehlow model shows consistency. The overpressure effects 
had gone south of Rhône valley, causing damage to ceilings 
and room at 2.2 km away. At a distance of 4.2 km, it was 
observed that some walls were moved and damaged while 
inflicting minor structure damage and breaking windows at 8 
km away. In addition, some villagers at Vienne, which was 
located at 16 km upstream from the refinery, had claimed 
2567
that they felt the blast from the explosion. Although the 
damaging impact did on building structures was interpreted 
through the means of calculating the overpressure from the 
Coupling and Baker-Strehlow models, this was found to 
have deviated from the actual structural building analyzed in 
the report compared to the TNT Equivalent model impact 
analysis results at 4.2 km, 8 km, and 16 km. At 2.2 km, 
Planas-Cuchi + TNT Equivalent model gave a truer value to 
the said report. 
 
TABLE XIV 
AT P = 8000 KPA (80 BAR)
Incident 
Case Radius 
Planas-Cuchi+TNT 
Equivalent method 
TNT Equivalent 
method 
Baker-Strehlow 
method 
ARIA Report for Ministry of Environment French 
(witness’ observation) 
336 t of 
propane at 
T61-443 
r (m) P0 (kPa) P0 (kPa) P0 (kPa) Diagnose 
50 329.38 (E15) 1219.18 (E15) 4.36 (E6) Fatalities approach 100% (E15) 
100 73.63 (E15) 255.52 (E15) 4.36 (E6) Injuries are universal, fatalities are widespread (E13) 
150 36.13 (E14) 100.25 (E15) 4.36 (E6) Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
160 32.66 (E14) 86.79 (E15) 4.36 (E6) Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
300 14.02 (E11) 24.73 (E13) 2.94 (E5) Serious injuries, fatality may occur (E11) 
2,200 1.73 (E4) 4.22 (E7) 0.42 (E1) Roofs damaged (E4) 
4,200 0.90 (E3) 2.18 (E4) 0.22 (E1) Walls moved (E4) 
8,000 0.47 (E2) 1.146 (E3) 0.13 (E1) Blast from explosion was felt, doors opened (E2) 
16,000 0.24 (E1) 0.284 (E1) 0.10 (E1) Blast from explosion was felt, doors opened (E1) 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Current studies have shown that chemical process 
industries involving propane storages are risky and bear a high 
potential for the occurrence of incidents such as VCE and 
BLEVEs. All 3 models demonstrate that there is a decrease in 
overpressure value as the distance from the source of 
explosion becomes greater. This is practically understood as 
the energy of explosion reduces by time and distance during 
energy dissipation and dispersion. Nevertheless, both TNT 
Equivalent and Baker-Strehlow models show a great deviation 
in the value of overpressure produced as compared to that of 
Planas-Cuchi and TNT Equivalent Coupling model. This is 
particularly seen at distance 50 m, 300 m, 2200 m, 8000 m, 
and 16000 m, in which the Coupling model displays higher 
precision in the results produced when compared with what 
witness(es) had observed and analysed in the French Ministry 
of Environment report. Thus, for future fire explosion analysis 
that concerns the condition of pressure changes in a vessel, the 
Planas-Cuchi and TNT Equivalent Coupling model would be 
most recommended. 
NOMENCLATURE 
t wall thickness m 
r radius m 
 tensile strength of structural steel MN/m2 
PR rupture pressure bar 
 peak side-on overpressure kPa 
E explosion energy MJ 
WTNT equivalent mass of TNT kg 
PS scaled overpressure kPa 
Patm atmospheric pressure kPa 
Po peak side-on overpressure kPa 
LPG liquefied petroleum gas  
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